In nearly 300 years since its introduction by John Arbuthnot (1710), null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) has become an important tool for scientists. During the early 20th century, the founders of modern statistics (R. A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, and Egon Pearson) showed how to apply this tool in widely varying circumstances, often in agriculture, and nearly all in applications that were far afield from Dr. Arbuthnot's attempt to prove the existence of God. Cox (1977) termed Fisher's procedure "significance testing" to differentiate it from Neyman and Pearson's "hypothesis testing." He drew distinctions between these 2 ideas, but those distinctions are sufficiently fine that modern users lose little if we ignore them. The ability of statisticians to construct schemes that require humans to make distinctions that appear to be smaller than the threshold of comprehension for most humans is a theme we will address when we discuss a levels.
With the advantage of increasing use, practitioners became accustomed to the darker reality as the shortcomings of NHST became apparent. The reexamination of the viability of NHST was described by Anderson et al. (2000) , who showed that during the past 60 years, an increasing number of articles have questioned the utility of NHST. It is revealing to notice that over the same time period Thompson , it seems worthwhile to provide a balanced, up-to-date summary of the situations for which NHST still remains a viable tool for research as well as describing those situations for which alternative procedures seem better suited. We conclude with some recommendations for improving the practice of NHST.
Most of the criticisms of NHST focus on its misuse by researchers rather than on inherent weaknesses. Johnson (1999) claimed that misuse was an intrinsic weakness of NHST and that somehow the tool itself encourages misuse. However, Johnson, perhaps because of a well-developed sense of polite diplomacy, did not cite specific circumstances of individual scientists misusing NHST. We agree that any statistical procedure, including NHST, can be misused, but we have seen no evidence that NHST is misused any more often than any other statistical procedure. For example, the most common statistical measure, the mean, is usually inappropriate when the underlying distribution contains outliers. This is an easy mistake. For example, such an error was made by Graunt (1662) and took more than 300 years to be uncovered (Zabell 1976). 1 E-mail: dan.robinson@mail.utexas.edu 263
The decade of the 1990s has seen a big increase in articles defending NHST The possibility of erroneous conclusions generated by the misuse of statistical procedures suggests several corrective alternatives. One Draconian extreme might be to ban all such procedures from use. Another approach might be to adopt the strict caveat emptor philosophy of the free market. Both approaches seem unnecessarily stringent. It is hard to imagine any open-minded person adopting either extreme. The former approach is not acceptable because it would essendtially eliminate everything, and the latter approach fails because some quality control over scientific discourse is essential. We favor a middle path--a mixed plan that includes both enlightened standards for journal editors as well as a program to educate users of statistical procedures. This article is an attempt to contribute to that education. Some researchers (Schmidt 1996) have felt that the misuse of NHST was sufficiently widespread to justify its ban within the journals of the American Psychological Association (APA). The APA formed a task force in 1997 to recommend appropriate statistical practices. As a small part of its deliberations, the task force briefly considered this extreme proposal (i.e., banning NHST) as well. Johnson (1999) , citing Meehl (1997), surmised that the proposal to ban NHST ultimately was rejected due to the appearance of censorship, and not because the proposal was without merit. This was not the case; banning NHST was never deemed to be a credible option. There are 2 key parts of this quote-the trivial "once every twenty experiments" and the more important, "he knows how to design an experiment so that it will rarely fail to give a significant result." Fisher believed NHST made sense only in the context of a continuing series of experiments that were aimed at confirming the size and direction of the effects of specific treatments. Throughout Fisher's work, he used statistical tests to come to 1 of 3 conclusions. (1) When P was small (<0.05), he declared that an effect has been demonstrated. (2) When it was large (P> 0.2), he concluded that if there was an effect, it was too small to be detected with an experiment this size. (3) When it lies between these extremes, he discussed how to design the next experiment to estimate the effect better.
Null hypothesis significance testing as it is used today hardly resembles Fisher's original idea. Its critics worry that researchers too commonly interpret results that show P> 0.05 as evidence of no effect and rarely replicate results where P < 0.05 in a series of experiments designed to firmly establish the size and direction of the experimental effects. This conception is of a science built largely on single-shot studies in which researchers choose to reach conclusions based on these obviously arbitrary criteria. We should mention, however, that a strong counter-current to this conception is reflected in the Cochrane Collaboration-a database containing more than 250,000 random assignment medical experiments in which all of the included studies provide the information necessary for a meta-analysis. Such meta-analyses allow the formal concatenation of results, which then can yield more powerful inferences than would be possible from a single study. Robert Boruch, at the University of Pennsylvania, is currently organizing a parallel database for the social sciences; this effort is called the Campbell Collaboration. ) that the typical null hypothesis is almost always false. We agree that NHST is being misused when it tests a null hypothesis in which the effect can only go in a single direction. Reporting a P-value for a correlation that was computed for reliability and validity coefficients represents vacuous information (Abelson 1997 ) and constitutes what Brennan (2001:172) called "excessive use of P-values." If Pvalues add nothing to the interpretation of results, leave them out, although sometimes a significant P-value may just be scientific shorthand for a substantial effect size. This occurs if one's reaction to a significant P-value is "if the difference is statistically significant with that small a sample, it must be a huge effect." Obviously, communicating effect size with P-value and sample size is indirect, but sometimes such shorthand aids in efficient communication.
Not all P-values, however, are unimportant. Wainer (1999) mentioned several examples of research hypotheses in which simply being able to reject the null would be a considerable contribution to science. For example, if physicists had been able to design an experiment that could reject the null hypothesis that the speed of light is equal in different reference frames that are moving at very different speeds, Albert Einstein-then a young Swiss patent clerk who sug-gested otherwise-might have remained obscure. Nevertheless, we agree that many of the null hypotheses tested in the research literature are false only in the statistical sense of the word, but, as a practical matter, could be treated as if they were true with little likelihood of any negative consequences. Newtonian physics jumps to mind as 1 example of a false hypothesis that under very broad conditions could profitably be treated as true. Guthery et al. (2001) also argued that although most statistical null hypotheses are false, there are many research null hypotheses in wildlife science in which stating no effect constitutes a legitimate challenge to untested assumptions.
The probabilistic appendage to a statement such as "The foraging patterns were not the same for all months (P < 0.05)" seems unnecessary since everyone would agree that it is extraordinarily unlikely that 12 population means would be identical. Usually, if large enough samples are obtained, P-values can be made arbitrarily small. This criticism of NHST seems to be a valid one. If the only purpose of a hypothesis test is to canonize a small difference whose size and direction are of no interest, we agree that NHST is unnecessary. Further, we generally agree with critics who suggest that it is exactly the size and direction of observed differences that should be reported, and not "naked P-values" (Anderson et al. 2001:374) . We depart from complete agreement with such sentiments for those (admittedly more rare) circumstances in which such differences are of secondary importance (e.g., Ho: I am pregnant) and simply being able to reject the null hypothesis (or not) is what is of principal interest. We also depart from the critics in our belief that we should modify NHST to suit our modern understanding rather than eliminate it. We discuss some plausible modifications in later sections.
THE ROLE OF EFFECT SIZES IN NHST
An ordinal claim regarding the direction of the difference or relationship can be a substantial contribution (Frick 1996) . In some cases, however, knowing the direction of the effect is not sufficient in deciding whether an intervention is cost-effective. In these situations, calculating the size of the effect usually is critical. Conducting NHST does not preclude the researcher from calculating effect sizes. Whereas NHST is useful in determining statistical significance, effect sizes are useful in determining practical importance. Of course, we would prefer to see all effect sizes accompanied with a confidence interval that indicates the precision (or imprecision) with which that effect has been estimated. Nonetheless, we find the notion that one must somehow choose between conducting NHST or calculating effect sizes and confidence intervals to be absurd. Both a frying pan and butter are useful on their own, but together they can do things that neither can do alone. So, too, is the case with NHST, effect sizes, and confidence intervals. Researchers should be able to use any statistical technique that will help shed light on the interesting aspects of their data. Tukey (1969:83) recommended that "we ought to try to calculate what will help us most to understand our data, and their indications. We ought not to be bound by preconceived notions-or preconceived analyses."
Thompson ( Obviously, one should provide effect sizes or, for that matter, any other type of statistical information that yields useful insights into the characteristics of data. However, requiring authors to always provide effect size information may be overkill in those situations in which such information adds little to the correct interpretation of the data, and more dangerously, if it distracts or misleads readers. For example, a major use of NHST is in testing model fit, such as using a likelihood ratio to compare a restricted model to its more general parent. What does effect size mean in this context? Also, in some instances (e.g., medical research), it is a practical impossibility to obtain good estimates of effect size, because once THE PAST AND FUTURE OF NHST * Robinson and Wainer 267 a treatment is determined to be superior, researchers are ethically forbidden from using the inferior one. This particular circumstance provides a good illustration of 2 important ideas.
First, Will Rogers' colorful caveat "What we don't know won't hurt us; it's what we do know that ain't so" has important application in hypothesis testing. Indeed, finding a significant, but inaccurate, direction of a difference or relationship has been called a Type III error by Henry Kaiser in his (1970) Psychometric Society presidential address, an idea discussed many years earlier by Wald (1947). This suggests that accompanying an effect size by a suitably small P-value is more than just an adornment.
The second issue worth mentioning is the question "what is the effect whose size we are reporting?" In medical research, 1 measure of a treatment's effectiveness might be the number of people who don't get the disease who would have otherwise, or the number of people cured who would not have been-in short, the causal effect of the treatment. Let us consider the ethical conundrum of trying to get a good estimate of the effect of a treatment. Obviously, we want to know the direction of the effect of the treatment, and once we know it with reasonable certainty, we are ethically bound not to use the inferior treatment. But how far can we continue with the experiment to be "sure enough?" Anscombe (1963) proposed a modification to the typical Neyman-Pearson formulation that is more in keeping with medical needs and forms a model for the flexibility of approach we support. Anscombe pointed out that we are not interested in the asymptotic probability of error; rather, he observed that for any medical treatment, there would be a finite number of patients treated. A small number of them will be treated as part of the clinical trial; the rest will be given the treatment that the clinical trial decides is "best." If we use too small a number of patients in the trial, the decision of which treatment is best is more likely to be in error. And if so, all the rest of the patients will be given the wrong treatment. If we use too many patients in the trial, then all the patients in the trial on the other treatments will have been mistreated unnecessarily. Anscombe proposed that 1 criterion of analysis, 1 "effect," should be minimizing the total number of patients (both those in the trial and those treated afterwards) who are given the poorer treatment.
Finally, some situations do not warrant obtaining a large or practical effect. W.J. McKeachie at the University of Michigan (personal communication) noted that effect sizes are mostly useful for ...research that is directed toward decisions with some immediate practical consequences. As I see it, much research is concerned with developing or testing theory. If it is to test an existing theory, even a small difference should increase one's confidence that the theory has some validity. Similarly if you are contributing to theory development, the size of the result is not so important as its heuristic value in stimulating thinking, which may then be tested by further research. Tukey's advice incorporates a great deal about what modern psychological investigations have told us about how humans understand probability. Modern concepts of probability began with Kolmogorov's mathematical definition of probability as a measure of sets in an abstract space of events. While all mathematical properties of probability can be derived from this definition, it is of little value in helping us to apply probability to real-life situations. Understanding how humans understand probability was helped enormously by the concept of "personal probability" that was proposed almost a half century ago by both Savage (1954) and De Finetti (1974), who contended that probability is a common concept that people can use coherently if their inferences using it follow a few simple rules. Unfortunately, in a series of ingenious experiments, the psychologists Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 2> .1, or do not know yet) has the advantages of stressing that research is a continuing activity and never having to fail to reject a null hypothesis that is likely untrue. Fisher (1929:192) also commented on NHST's inability to support a null hypothesis as true:
For the logical fallacy of believing that a hypothesis has been proved to be true, merely because it is not contradicted by the available facts, has no more right to insinuate itself in statistical than in other kinds of scientific reasoning ... it would therefore, add greatly to the clarity with which the tests of significance are regarded if it were generally understood that tests of significance, when used accurately, are capable of rejecting or invalidating hypotheses, in so far as they are contradicted by the data: but that they are never capable of establishing them as certainly true... Rather than concluding that "there was no difference among the treatments (P= 0.07)" or that "the 2 variables were not correlated (P = 0.06)," authors should instead simply state that "the direction of the differences among the treatments was undetermined" or that "the sign of the correlation among the 2 variables was undetermined." This language avoids leaving the impression that the null hypothesis was accepted-or more appropriately, failed to be rejected-and suggests rather that more data are needed before a determination can be made. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

